Offices of Maynard Cooper Gale in downtown Birmingham (From fravert.com)

Collier attempts to plead his way around state-agent immunity by alleging that the Governor’s actions “were willful, malicious, fraudulent, in bad faith and/or beyond [his]authority.” But the absolute sovereign immunity of constitutional officers does not have a “bad-faith” exception in suits for monetary damages.

A State agent shall not be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity. . . .

(2) when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law."

We have also held that deputy sheriffs are immune from suit to the same extent as sheriffs. "In general, the acts of the deputy sheriff are the acts of the sheriff. The deputy sheriff is the alter ego of the sheriff." Carr v. City of Florence, Alabama, 916 F.2d 1521, 1526 (11th Cir.1990) . . . "[Under Alabama law, a] deputy is legally an extension of the sheriff. If the deputy's acts are generally considered the acts of the sheriff, it is logical that those acts should enjoy the same immunity covering the sheriff's own acts." Carr, at 1526, quoted with approval in Wright v. Bailey, at 303.

In this case, none of the exceptions set out in Parker v. Amerson applies. Deputy Hatfield was on duty when she left the papers at Alexander's place of employment. Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of Deputy Hatfield, individually and in her official capacity, was proper, based on the sovereign immunity granted under Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901.

"Yella Fella" Jimmy Rane: Part of Mike Hubbard's tribe

Tribalism is the state of being organized in, or advocating for, a tribe or tribes. In terms of conformity, tribalism may also refer in popular cultural terms to a way of thinking or behaving in which people are more loyal to their tribe than to their friends, their country, or any other social group.

U.S. Judge Madeline Haikala (From al.com)

The standard for considering a motion for entry of a judgment of acquittal requires the Court to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Government. When evidence is subject to multiple interpretations, some of which favor the Government and some of which favor the defense, the Court has construed the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. However, when evidence is unfavorable to the Government, but is not ambiguous, the Court is not required to ignore it. When critical gaps appear in the Government’s case, the Court is not required to turn a blind eye to them. On the contrary, the law requires the Court to consider the objective reasonableness of Officer Parker’s use of force within the totality of the circumstances. The Court has viewed the full expanse of evidence concerning the use of force and is left with the firm conviction that the evidence concerning use of force in this case is not adequate to support a unanimous verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. When, as here, “a hypothesis of innocence is sufficiently reasonable and sufficiently strong, then a reasonable trier of fact must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt about guilt.” United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 1982) (Anderson, J., concurring) aff'd, 462 U.S. 356 (1983). Viewing the relevant evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the Court has determined that that evidence could not be accepted by twelve jurors as adequate and sufficient to support the conclusion of Officer Parker’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Bell also argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction unless it excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, on the theory that if there is such a reasonable hypothesis the jury must necessarily have had reasonable doubt of his guilt. . . .

We hold that the appellant has incorrectly stated the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence. It is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence. Viewing the evidence presented in this case and the inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the government . . . we conclude that it was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that Bell altered the endorsement on the check, deposited it to his account, and thereby was enabled to take and did take $10,000 with intent to steal from the care, custody, control, management or possession of Dade Federal.

These cases raise an important question concerning what degree of protection, if any, the First Amendment provides to speech that discloses the contents of an illegally intercepted communication. That question is both novel and narrow. Despite the fact that federal law has prohibited such disclosures since 1934,[1] this is the first time that we have confronted such an issue.

The suit at hand involves the repeated intentional disclosure of an illegally intercepted cellular telephone conversation about a public issue. The persons who made the disclosures did not participate in the interception, but they did know—or at least had reason to know—that the interception . . .  was unlawful. Accordingly, these cases present a conflict between interests of the highest order—on the one hand, the interest in the full and free dissemination of information concerning public issues, and, on the other hand, the interest in individual privacy and, more specifically, in fostering private speech. The Framers of the First Amendment surely did not foresee the advances in science that produced the conversation, the interception, or the conflict that gave rise to this action. It is therefore not surprising that Circuit judges, as well as the Members of this Court, have come to differing conclusions about the First Amendment's application to this issue. Nevertheless, having considered the interests at stake, we are firmly convinced that the disclosures made by respondents in this suit are protected by the First Amendment.

Simply put, the issue here is this: "Where the punished publisher of information has obtained the information in question in a manner lawful in itself but from a source who has obtained it unlawfully, may the government punish the ensuing publication of that information based on the defect in a chain?" Boehner, 191 F. 3d, at 484-485 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).

First, respondents (the journalists) played no part in the illegal interception. Rather, they found out about the interception only after it occurred, and in fact never learned the identity of the person or persons who made the interception. Second, their access to the information on the tapes was obtained lawfully, even though the information itself was intercepted unlawfully by someone else. . . . Third, the subject matter of the conversation was a matter of public concern.

As a general matter, "state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards." Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U. S. 97, 102 (1979). More specifically, this Court has repeatedly . . .  held that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need . . . of the highest order." Id., at 103; see also Florida Star v. B. J. F., 491 U. S. 524 (1989); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 829 (1978).

In these cases, privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance. As Warren and Brandeis stated in their classic law review article: "The right of privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general interest."

Don Siegelman

So now some of these same people who fought the lottery in 1999, whose greed or lust for power cheated our children out of a better life, want Alabama voters to bail them out.

Governor Bentley, a staunch Baptist, once joined the loud “Christian” refrain opposing a lottery as a sin, immoral, something so wicked it would surely usher in prostitution, muggings, robberies and create a wave of gambling addiction. These were the arguments used by opponents to defeat the “Education Lottery” referendum in 1999.

I went directly to the largest gathering of many faiths, mostly Baptist and listened to their holy proclamations about the lottery being “immoral”. I stood and answered: ‘I’ll tell you what I think is immoral. I think immoral for children because of the color of their skin or where they were born or to whom, not to be able to reach their god-given potential because they can’t get a quality education.

I had been asking the people of Alabama to establish a lottery since 1989. Over and over I pleaded “Every child, regardless of where they are born or to whom, deserve the right to quality education and every child should have the hope and dream of knowing that if they make their grades and stay out of trouble, they’ll be able to go to college free.

In 1998 I was elected Governor again calling for an “Education Lottery,” a Georgia style lottery with 100% of the proceeds going into the “Alabama Education Trust Fund”.

First, the “Alabama Education Lottery” would have provided free higher education for every high school graduate, tuition free college, community colleges, or trade schools free.

Secondly, the Alabama Education Lottery would provide free preschool, relieving working mothers of the worry and expense of day care, knowing at the end of the day their child would be better prepared to read, write, and get along with other children before they entered the first grade.

Finally, the Alabama Education Lottery would provide technology to put the world’s knowledge at the fingertips of every child, to assist teachers in accessing lectures by the brightest instructors in the world on every conceivable subject. For rural Alabama which lacks the tax resources and ability to raise needed education dollars, technology would be ‘the great equalizer’, bringing the best educational resources, lectures, free college classes from the best colleges and universities in the world to every child in every part of the state.

In order to get this constitutional amendment establishing the “Education Lottery” passed, I had to raise money for television, radio and newspaper advertising and money to get out the vote. Unknown at the time, Karl Rove’s confidante, Ralph Reed, President of the “‘Christian Coalition’, lobbyist Jack Abramoff and Mike Scanlon, who had worked for my opponent, Bob Riley, and the Mississippi Choctaw Indian casinos had engaged in a money laundering scheme to funnel up to $20,000,000 from the Indian casinos into Alabama to defeat me, to defeat the lottery, to defeat other gaming proposals. (See “Capitol Punishment”, by Abramoff, PP 184-189)

The opposition, funded by the Mississippi casinos, ran a smothering barrage of TV ads portraying corrupt politicians with cash stacked high like gangsters, ending their ads with:

“Maybe a lottery, but not this lottery.”

House at 212 Dexter Avenue in Mountain Brook (From zillow.com)

Speaking of Alabama Power and Balch Bingham, they are connected to a curious outfit called Partnership for Affordable Clean Energy (PACE). It sounds like PACE is concerned with keeping energy affordable for consumers. But published reports indicate PACE's primary purpose--perhaps its only purpose--is to ensure that Alabama Power's rates stay at a comfortably profitable level. What law firm helped incorporate PACE? Why, it was Balch Bingham. Who really is behind PACE, and how is it funded? That is not entirely clear, but Mobile-based investigative journalist Eddie Curran is shining considerable light on that question. . . . We think Curran's reporting on Alabama Power and PACE, at his blog mrdunngoestomontgomery.com, is worth a look. The following post (at Curran's site) describes the curious relationship between Alabama Power, PACE, and the Montgomery-based political consulting firm Matrix LLC.

Don Siegelman

Knowing I had a fight on my hands, I asked Alabama business leaders to kick in the lion’s share of money needed to pass the lottery referendum. Business leaders knew how Alabama would benefit from an educated workforce, and generously supported the lottery campaign.

On October 12, 1999 the Mississippi casino owners and states surrounding Alabama won. The majority of voters were duped by some good meaning Christians and a few preachers, politicians and the ‘Christian Coalition’ who were bought by millions from Mississippi casinos. I can forgive those who came after me, but I’ll never forget or forgive those who put their greed for money and power ahead of the lives of our children.

Among the CEO’s I had asked to give or raise money to pass the lottery referendum was HealthSouth’s Richard Scrushy. HealthSouth ended up raising $250,000. I asked CEO Mr. Scrushy, to rejoin a nonpaying board to which he had been appointed by three previous governors and from which he had recently resigned. My political enemies charged that this was a bribe.

Months after the referendum had been defeated, months after I had re-appointed Mr. Scrushy to the state board, HealthSouth gave $250,000 to pay off a debt that had been incurred by the Democratic Party during the lottery campaign. Eight months after the lottery had been defeated I agreed to be on a bank loan to help pay off the lottery debt. Obviously, there would have been no way for anyone to have foreseen a lottery debt at the time I made the appointment of Mr. Scrushy but that didn’t stop the prosecutors from alleging I had profited from ‘a deal to appoint Mr. Scrushy.’ It was so ludicrous that my lawyers didn’t even press the point.

The trial judge, Mark Fuller, would not allow us to tell the jury that the U.S. Attorney’s husband had been paid by my opponents to defeat me. My judge, Mark Fuller, who had been on the Republican Executive Committee and had opposed the lottery, told the jury that a contribution to the lottery campaign could be considered ‘a thing of value’ to me because I supported the lottery referendum, even though I did not personally benefit by a single penny.

I had been indicted one month after I announced I would run for reelection. Then I was brought to trial one month before my primary election in 2006. The US Attorney’s husband was the campaign manager for my general election opponent, Bob Riley, while Riley’s former staffer, Mike Scanlon, funneled millions of dollars from the Mississippi Choctaw casinos into Alabama to benefit Mr. Riley’s campaign.

So now some of these same people who fought the lottery in 1999, whose greed or lust for power cheated our children out of a better life, want Alabama voters to bail them out.

First, please remember, Medicaid would not be in trouble in the first place if elected Alabama politicians had accepted the billions of dollars that came along with the Affordable Care Act. They foolishly looked that gift horse in the mouth, yelping political criticism at President Obama trying to curry political favor. Shame on you!

Secondly, some hypocrites who opposed the lottery before now want to be bailed out from having to pass tax reform to force large foreign corporations, out of state, multinational corporations to pay their fair share of taxes. Hundreds of companies make billions of profits in Alabama but don’t pay a penny. Foreign corporations which own nearly 30% of our timber land, pay only pennies in taxes compared to our neighbor, Georgia.

Finally, for goodness sakes pass true “Home Rule” to allow school boards to propose…propose ballot initiatives to allow citizens to vote to raise money for their local schools.

Today, I am not even sure how much money a lottery would yield, but I do know this, whatever it might raise should go to educate our children and voters should not let the Governor or Alabama Legislature get their hands on a penny of it.

So I say, ‘Maybe a lottery, but not this lottery.’

Greene County, Missouri, Sheriff Jim Arnott (From KSPR)

Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. . . .

X-ray of Carol Shuler's broken arm, before surgical repair.

"[A] person is `seized' ... when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained" such that, "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave."United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). A seizure is effected by force "when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied[,]" such as where a law enforcement officer pulls his vehicle "alongside [a] fleeing car and sideswipe[s] it, producing [a] crash" regardless of whether the officer intends "to give the oncoming driver the option of a voluntary stop" or "to produce a collision." Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597-99, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1381-82, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). A seizure by means of show of authority requires both a show of authority and submission to that authority. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628-29, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1551-52, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). That is, a government officer effects a seizure by means of a show of authority where "the officer's words and actions would have conveyed ... to a reasonable person" that "he was being ordered to restrict his movement," and those words and actions actually "produce his stop." Id. Certain "circumstances ... might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave," including "the display of a weapon by an officer ... or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877. An arrest is the "quintessential" example of a seizure of the person. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624, 111 S.Ct. at 1550.

Officer Eric Parker (From npr.org)

Officer Parker testified that although the subject—Mr. Patel—stated that he did not understand English, Officer Parker did not believe him. . . . Officer Parker reasoned that when the subject did not answer questions, the subject was refusing to cooperate with the investigation and was being evasive.

The evidence supported the Government’s argument that when Officer Slaughter called out to Mr. Patel so that Officer Slaughter could ask some questions, Mr. Patel did not run from the police or ignore them. Instead, Mr. Patel’s behavior was friendly; he turned, waved, and walked toward the officers. . . . Mr. Patel did not understand the questions that Officer Slaughter asked, but he did his best to communicate to the police that he was from India and that he lived at 148 Hardiman Place Lane. Officer Slaughter ignored the fact that Mr. Patel repeatedly said, “No English” and continued to press Mr. Patel for answers to his questions. . . . Officer Parker understood that Mr. Patel did not speak English because he said to Officer Slaughter, “He’s saying ‘No English.’ He doesn’t understand what you’re saying”; but Officer Parker made no attempt to address the language barrier.

At trial, Officer Parker denied that he performed a leg sweep when he took Mr. Patel to the ground or that he intentionally kicked Mr. Patel. . . . Officer Parker has no training in or experience with martial arts.

The Government argued that perhaps out of frustration or perhaps to act tough for Officer Slaughter, Officer Parker took Mr. Patel to the ground. . . . Without further warning and without enlisting Officer Slaughter’s assistance, Officer Parker kicked Mr. Patel’s legs out from under him, causing Mr. Patel to fall to the frozen ground. The Government added that because Officer Parker held Mr. Patel’s hands during the takedown maneuver—a maneuver which Officer Parker eventually acknowledged constituted a leg sweep—Mr. Patel was unable to use his hands and arms to break his fall, and his face and neck absorbed the impact of the collision with the hard ground. . . . Mr. Patel suffered a bloody nose, and the neck trauma caused Mr. Patel to experience paralysis. (Doc. 107, p. 147). The Government argued that Officer Parker had to have known that Mr. Patel would suffer an injury if he restrained Mr. Patel’s hands while throwing him violently to the ground.

Officer Parker stated that as he pulled Mr. Patel toward the grass, he (Officer Parker) placed his weight on his right leg, and he lost his balance and fell with Mr. Patel.

When he returned to the precinct, while Officer Parker was working on his report, Lieutenant Harrell watched the dashcam video of the takedown. After he reviewed the video, Lieutenant Harrell questioned Officer Parker about the technique that he used in the takedown. Lieutenant Harrell asked Officer Parker if he used a leg sweep. Officer Parker replied that he did not recall using a leg sweep. . . . Lieutenant Harrell testified that later, he and Officer Parker watched the dashcam video together, and at some point, Officer Parker acknowledged that he used a leg sweep. . . . Officer Parker denies that he told Lieutenant Harrell that he used a leg sweep to take Mr. Patel to the ground. . . . In his written report about the incident, Officer Parker did not provide a description of his takedown technique, and he did not write that he lost his balance and fell with Mr. Patel.

Abdul Kallon (From al.com)

The doctrine holds that lower United States federal courts other than the Supreme Court should not sit in direct review of state court decisions unless Congress has specifically authorized such relief. In short, federal courts below the Supreme Court must not become a court of appeals for state court decisions. The state court plaintiff has to find a state court remedy, or obtain relief from the U.S. Supreme Court.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar actions by non parties to the earlier state-court judgment simply because, for purposes of preclusion law, they could be considered in privity with a party to the judgment.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006). The district court ruling in the instant case is clear error, conflicting with U.S. Supreme Court precedent.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

We find no error in the district court's determination that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded it from ruling on Roger Shuler's claim that the judgment against him in state court, resulting in the issuance of the writ of attachment, was invalid. Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that a losing party in a state-court lawsuit may not seek an order in federal court that would "effectively nullify the state court judgment") (internal quotation marks omitted). However, Carol Shuler was not a party to the state tort action that resulted in Roger Shuler's liability to McGarity, therefore, the Rooker Feldman doctrine did not bar the district court from addressing her claims. See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (per curiam) (holding that Rooker Feldman does not apply "where the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was not a party to the underlying state-court proceeding").

A person commits the crime of assault of a law enforcement officer, corrections officer, emergency personnel, highway worker in a construction zone or work zone, utility worker, cable worker, or probation and parole officer in the first degree if such person attempts to kill or knowingly causes or attempts to cause serious physical injury to a law enforcement officer, corrections officer, emergency personnel, highway worker in a construction zone or work zone, utility worker, cable worker, or probation and parole officer.

A person commits the crime of assault of a law enforcement officer . . . in the second degree if such person:

(1) Knowingly causes or attempts to cause physical injury to a law enforcement officer . . .  by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument;

(2) Knowingly causes or attempts to cause physical injury to a law enforcement officer . . . by means other than a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument;

(3) Recklessly causes serious physical injury to a law enforcement officer . . . ; or

(4) While in an intoxicated condition or under the influence of controlled substances or drugs, operates a motor vehicle or vessel in this state and when so operating, acts with criminal negligence to cause physical injury to a law enforcement officer . . . ;

(5) Acts with criminal negligence to cause physical injury to a law enforcement officer . . . by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument;

(6) Purposely or recklessly places a law enforcement officer . . .  in apprehension of immediate serious physical injury; or

(7) Acts with criminal negligence to create a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to a law enforcement officer. . . . 

X-ray of Carol Shuler's broken arm prior to surgical repair

(1) Such person recklessly causes physical injury to a law enforcement officer . . . ;

(2) Such person purposely places a law enforcement officer . . . in apprehension of immediate physical injury;

(3) Such person knowingly causes or attempts to cause physical contact with a law enforcement officer . . . without the consent of the law enforcement officer. . . .

"[A] person is `seized' ... when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained" such that, "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).

Jessica Medeiros Garrison and Luther Strange

“The foundation of an action for libel or slander is a malicious injury to reputation, and any false and malicious imputation of crime or moral delinquency by one published of and concerning another, which subjects the person to disgrace, ridicule, odium, or contempt in the estimation of his friends and acquaintances, or the public, with resulting damage to his reputation, is actionable either per se or per quod․”

Steel manufacturing in China

"You had an affair with Gincie Walker, right?"

No reply.

"Did you have an affair with Gincie Walker . . . is that correct?"

No reply.

"Hello."

Silence.

Gincie Walker Upton

Small manufacturers say they have increased productivity to compete. . . . But small manufacturers insist labor costs are not relevant when in many cases heavily-subsidized goods from China have been sold in America for below what the local manufacturers pay for raw materials.

"Labor costs have nothing to do with it," said Bill Upton, president of Pelham, Alabama-based Vulcan Threaded Products Inc. Vulcan makes steel bars and rods for everything from air conditioning units to sprinkler systems, is the last American firm of its kind, and won a trade case against Chinese competitors in 2008.

"We have a lean, efficient operation and we can compete against anyone in the world on a level playing field. But there's no way we can compete against finished goods that cost less than the raw materials," Upton said.

AF: There is an avalanche of speculation across the media. . . . When these people are contacting me, I say the governor is my friend, and I've been over a couple of times and prayed with him. This is devastating. When they say, "What do you think of this allegation about trips taken by the governor on the jet, and overtime by people who guarded him, and personal things that have been alleged . . .

RB: I read some of that stuff from Donald Watkins. . . .

AF: There is this guy Legal Schnauzer, or something . . .

RB: Legal Schnauzer is the one who accused Rob Riley and got sued . . . he's a slimy guy.

Kimberly convinced Pikamab that UAB had access to unique databases (each called a “Cohort”) that categorized the biological characteristics of medical patients for certain diseases, such as lupus and lupus nephritis. Indeed, in 2011 (prior to the contracts at issue being signed), Kimberly represented that UAB was the only institution that could perform the contract work and stated that he would perform the contract with an utmost level of diligence by stating to Ramakrishnan in a telephone call: “ I will do a great job on these studies” (the “Misrepresentation”).

When a research institution like UAB undertakes formal research on behalf of a sponsor, it is an industry custom that the investigating institution provide a comprehensive report setting forth, among other things, raw data as well as information sufficient to verify the methodology, scope and accuracy of the research (the “Deliverables”).

Defendants utterly failed to provide any Deliverables . . ., even though each contract specifically provided that the Defendants were to provide progress reports and final reports on the research. . . . Notwithstanding his reporting obligations, Defendants delivered a purported final report in the form of a 10-line email on April 30, 2012 that was completely useless. Moreover, from that 10 line email, Pikamab discovered that Defendants lied, misled, and did not perform the relevant studies as per the contract requirements.

Robert Kimberly

As a result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct above, Pikamab was unable to close on least $11 million dollars in financing. Such financing was contingent upon Pikamab being able to provide verifiable research results supporting the Invention. In addition, Pikamab was unable to close on strategic licensing deals with bio-pharma companies who were eager to be involved in the Invention, but who required proof-of-concept data. But Defendants’ breaches deprived Pikamab of the information needed to satisfy the requirements of investors and bio-pharma partners. Because of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Pikamab ran out of money and was unable to finance new studies. Moreover, Pikamab wrote to other investigators of the lupus Cohort, but none were interested in investigating or resolving Pikamab’s complaints.

Donald Trump during his "Second Amendment people" speech (From cnn.com)

Just a few sentences after the “Second Amendment” remark, Trump boasted, “we have such great Justices, you saw my list of 11 that have been vetted and respected.” At the top of the list—prepared not by Trump but by the Heritage Foundation, the conservative-to-libertarian think tank funded by the Coors family, the Koch Brothers, the Bradley Foundation, the Scaife Foundation, and the Olin Foundation, some of the same funders who have blocked the nomination of Judge Merrick Garland—is Judge William Pryor of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

Pryor is also (in-)famous for a 2000 speech he gave (to the Heritage Foundation, incidentally) in which he called Miranda v. Arizona one of the two “worst examples of judicial activism.” (The other, of course, was Roe.) If you’ve ever watched a cop series on TV, you know Miranda—that’s the case that required police to tell arrestees “you have the right to remain silent.” 

In Pryor’s world, those warnings wouldn’t exist.

Bill Pryor, in a gay-porn pose from the 1990s and badpuppy.com

Now, Bill Pryor is, by all accounts, a distinguished and ethical jurist. Born in 1962, he has had a brilliant career, serving as Alabama’s youngest attorney general from 1997-2003 before being nominated by President George W. Bush to a federal appeals court. 

Jessica Medeiros Garrison and Alabama AG Luther Strange

Abernathy contends, among other things, that Green Tree did not provide her with appropriate notice of its November 12, 2009, application for a default judgment and that, as a result, the trial court erred when it entered the November 13, 2009, default judgment. Specifically, she argues that Rule 55(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., required that her attorney be given three days' written notice before the entry of the November 13, 2009, default judgment and that the failure to provide such notice constitutes reversible error. We agree.

The failure to provide the notice of the application for a default judgment as required by Rule 55(b)(2) renders the default judgment "void, and not merely voidable," Bracknell v. S.E. Belcher, Inc., 517 So. 2d 588, 591 (Ala. 1987), and "requires a vacation of the default judgment," Southworth v. University of South Alabama Med. Ctr., 637 So. 2d 896, 898 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994).

Don Blankenship

Our supreme court has stated that, when the three-day notice provision of Rule 55(b)(2) is violated, a trial court is "without discretion in the matter" and errs to reversal if it refuses to set aside the default judgment. Bracknell, 517 So. 2d at 591. Moreover, our supreme court has written that the failure to provide the notice required by Rule 55(b)(2) "requires vacation of the default judgment regardless as to whether defendant has shown a meritorious defense or not." Cockrell v. World's Finest Chocolate Co., 349 So. 2d 1117, 1120 (Ala. 1977) (emphasis added).

Pennsylvania AG Kathleen Kane (From ijr.com)

Over the past 15 months, beleaguered Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane has released a steady stream of messages retrieved from a state email server that show state officials and employees trading pornographic, racist and misogynistic messages.

There are jokes about rape and sexual assault, photos mocking African Americans and other minorities, and insults leveled at people because of their weight, their sexual orientation or their religion. At least two state Supreme Court justices and numerous officials in the office of the attorney general have been caught in the scandal that has been dubbed “Porngate.”

A small sampling: A photo of a pantsless woman on her knees performing oral sex on a man is captioned “Making your boss happy is your only job.” A picture of a white man fending off two African American men while carrying a bucket of fried chicken reads “BRAVERY At Its Finest.” The sender of the email that shows a group of men engaged in sex included this message to friends, “How friggin gay are you?”

“When you see these emails . . . it’s just a swamp of misogyny, racism, homophobia and white privilege. It taints everybody, especially in the judicial branch,” said Bruce Ledewitz, associate dean of academic affairs and a law professor at Duquesne University School of Law. “Some of these things are really disgusting. You get the impression that every white male office holder in the state is a creep.”

Justice Michael Eakin's decision to retire marks the latest fallout since embattled state Attorney General Kathleen Kane began releasing hundreds of emails in 2014 to the media and ethics agencies. Kane has since been indicted on perjury and other charges that she claims were trumped up because she took on the old boys' club of Pennsylvania's judiciary and law enforcement. . . .

The exchange of explicit and pornographic emails by state prosecutors was uncovered as part of Kane's internal review of how the office handled the investigation into Jerry Sandusky, the former Penn State assistant football coach now serving a lengthy prison sentence after being convicted in 2012 of 45 counts of child sexual abuse.