Carol Tovich Shuler

At one point, Defendant walked over to the door of the office and shut it. He then pointed to Craig and requested that he sit down. Craig again stated that he preferred to stand. With a raised voice, Defendant directed Craig to sit down. Craig, startled, stated that he preferred to stand. Defendant demanded, "Sit your a—down in that chair." Craig did not sit.

Defendant became enraged, opened the door to the office, and told Craig to "get his a—out of my office." Defendant, standing between the door and Craig, advanced towards Craig, a few steps away, yelling at him to get out of the office. Defendant then thumped Craig on the chest with the palms of his hands, knocking Craig off balance, grabbed Craig by his coat lapels, and threw Craig out the door a few feet away. Craig fell to the floor, bumping the secretary's desk in the process, and then he jumped up. The incident happened quickly, within two to three seconds.

Schmitz intervened and told Craig to leave. Craig told Defendant that he had assaulted a law enforcement officer and Defendant responded that Craig was trespassing. Schmitz again told Craig to leave, and he did.

Craig admitted that as [Raymond] was throwing him out the door and he was off balance, he momentarily, for about a second, put Defendant in a "headlock,"but he then realized that would worsen the situation so he immediately released the headlock.

There was evidence indicating that the victim of the assault had arrested or was attempting to arrest Appellant when Appellant launched himself backwards into the deputy, knocking him off his feet and into a ditch. It is certainly reasonable to infer that the officer did not give his consent to being knocked down, as well as consent to other physical contact upon himself.

We do not view the State's two witnesses as being in direct contradiction, as one was not sure how the contact was initiated, but the other witness was.

At trial, witness Hord testified as to events that occurred on October 20, 1997, outside her apartment complex in Lee's Summit, Missouri. Ms. Hord testified that, at some time during the late afternoon or evening hours on that day, J.D.B. and two of his friends, wearing Halloween masks, surrounded her car and "gyrat[ed] their hips in a sexual manner." Ms. Hord became "upset" and left to run errands. Later that evening, at approximately 8:20, Ms. Hord again encountered the three teens while she was outside near her mailbox. When she saw them approaching, Ms. Hord got in her car and locked the doors. She testified that the boys again surrounded her car, this time holding the masks in their hands and also one of the boys "[n]ot J.D.B., [a]nother one" was carrying a plastic "machete." Ms. Hord testified the boys were again gyrating their hips and that J.D.B. was right next to her driver's side window "pumping his hips right into the car, so the car was moving."

At this time, Ms. Hord left, drove to Wal-Mart and called the police. When asked by the juvenile's attorney if the incident had frightened her, Ms. Hord replied, "Not frightened. Alarmed. I didn't know what they were doing." When asked if she thought the boys were going to rob her, Ms. Hord responded, "My car door was locked. What could they do?" Ms. Hord also stated that she knew the "machete" was plastic just by looking at it and that she "thought they were starting Halloween early."

At trial, J.D.B. took the stand to testify on his own behalf. The juvenile testified that while Ms. Hord was at the mailbox he remarked to his friends, "Hand me a mask. I'm about to scare this woman." J.D.B. claimed he stood by her driver's side window, walked around to the passenger side window and then chased after her car as Ms. Hord left the scene. Contrary to Ms. Hord's testimony, J.D.B. said he was wearing a Halloween mask and was carrying the "machete" when the incident occurred. When asked about the events of that evening, J.D.B. remarked, "I was just trying to scare her. It was just going to be a joke." When asked what he would like to say to Ms. Hord, the juvenile replied, "I would like to apologize for scaring her. . . . And also, I would like to apologize for scratching her car. I didn't do it, but one of my friends did." After being questioned why he would apologize for scaring Ms. Hord, J.D.B. responded, "Because I do admit to that."

This court has previously defined physical contact sufficient to constitute an assault as "the touching of the person of another or something so intimately associated with, or attached to his person to be regarded as a part thereof."State v. Greathouse, 789 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Mo.App., 1990).

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the judgment, the only possible evidence of contact between Ms. Hord and J.D.B. was Ms. Hord's testimony that the juvenile was pushing against her car in such a manner that the car was moving. There is also J.D.B.'s testimony that he would apologize for scratching Ms. Hord's vehicle, which he then claimed was done not by him but by another of the juveniles. There is no evidence in the record of any contact that J.D.B. had with Ms. Hord's actual person. In order to support a conviction under this theory of assault, it must be found that the juvenile's contact with Ms. Hord's car was with something so intimately associated with or attached to her as to be considered a part of her person. The juvenile officer cites to no authority that would support such a finding, and this court can find no such Missouri authority.

Paul Weeks and son

In the meantime, Weeks discovered that the lender and another person had caused Weeks to lose a substantial amount of money from an estate in which Weeks had an expectancy interest. As a result, Weeks contends he has a legal right to a substantial monetary "offset" against the lender, in an amount that could easily exceed his promissory note obligation to the lender. If so, Weeks may not owe the alleged victim anything, unless and until the offset issue is resolved.

It is a political catechism in Missouri that to win statewide elections . . .  Democrats (such as Koster and Kander) need to pull votes out of the Springfield and southwest Missouri areas, which are traditionally Republican. . . . Koster's prosecution of Weeks over the Christmas holidays generated a lot of free publicity for Koster, who was already committed to running for governor (and by then, had already raised several million dollars to do so.) So, it's clear that Koster used the filing of his criminal prosecution against Paul Weeks, in southwest Missouri, just before 2015 when the campaign would be in full swing, for the purpose of generating a lot of free and favorable publicity for Koster's next election campaign.

In truth, Kander didn't stop anything; the transaction at issue was a 2009 personal-loan transaction -- and Kander didn't do anything until 2015. Yet, Jason Kander bragged to media outlets and on social media that, in January 2015, he just "stopped" a so-called "scam" that was based on a personal-loan transaction way back in 2009.

Richard D. Crites

With over 48 years of professional experience in the legal field, Richard has certainly proven himself as an accomplished professional and expert, not only in the criminal justice system but in the areas of domestic relations, personal injury and medical malpractice. Richard first practiced law in Tucson, Arizona, from 1968 to 1978. He served as a Juvenile Court Referee for the Pima County, Arizona Juvenile Court from 1972 to 1976. In 1978, he moved to Springfield, Missouri, where he started the first "in house" legal department at Springfield Public Utilities which is the largest municipally owned electric, gas, water and bus utility in the United States. He opened up his first law office in Springfield, Missouri in 1979.

Richard is licensed to practice in the courts of Arizona, the Arizona U.S. Dist. Court, the 9th Cir. U.S. Court of Appeals, the Northern District of Texas U.S. District Court, the Western District of Missouri U.S., Dist. Court, the State of Missouri; and the 8th Cir. U.S. Dist. Court. He represents law enforcement officers throughout the United States who protect and serve the public, yet are the subjects of ridicule, slander, assaults and discrimination, and in his 48 years of practice of law, he has represented thousands of law enforcement officers from all over the United States of America in various matters related to their job performance, specializing in Officer Involved Shooting (OIS) investigation and representation and protection of the officers involved. He estimates that he has represented and assisted well over 100 officers who have had to use deadly force in the line of duty. To further his ability to represent officers in OIS situations, Richard attended the Los Angeles Police Department Force Investigation Division week long class of Officer Involved Shooting investigations, and he was Certified by the Force Science Institute of Mankato, Minn, on September 3, 2010, after completing the training of Force Science Institute. He became a Deputy Sheriff, having been a deputy sheriff in Pulaski County, Missouri, Stone County, Missouri, Christian County, Missouri and is currently a deputy sheriff in Lawrence County, Missouri. He is a Hostage Negotiator, Taser instructor, Law Enforcement Officer and a Certified Instructor for the Missouri Public Safety Officer Training Program. His legal expertise includes personal injury practice, domestic relations practice, trial practice, administrative law, law enforcement, criminal investigation, legal consulting, and public safety.

Richard believes his reward for hard labor are his four children: Kimberly Garrett, who is a Licensed Professional Counselor; Amy Lee Crites, Esq. who is a licensed attorney at law in Missouri; Det. Kevin John Crites, who is a Detective at the Christian County, Mo., Sheriff's Dept.; and J. Peter Crites, M.D., who is a Board Certified Orthopaedic Surgeon in Practice with Mercy Hospitals, Springfield, Mo. and his six grand children.

Jeremy Lynn

There was a female, however, that had been trying to force the door closed and she was standing just behind the door and trying again to force it closed. She was very aggressive and fighting against the door. She was grabbed by her arms and restrained to stop her from harming one of us or herself. During this process she was pulling her arms away from me and tried to push me back with her arms and body. She was told to calm down repeatedly and ignored those commands. She was eventually handcuffed and taken outside.

FYI "caused contact" does not mean "initiated contact" - even if it did, which it doesn't, Carol pushing a door against the officer led to him restraining her or attempting to. The complaint lays out that when he did this, she fought him. She pushed pulled, flailed against him, kicking, using her body to bump him, etc. IOW fighting the restraint instead of submitting or being still. He describes that contact in sufficient detail to support the charge.

If there is a defense (such as his illegal presence, etc.) for that fighting against the officer with kick and body blows, that is a different issue. If she was justified in resisting, attempting to push the officer away or to escape his grasp would not be a crime.

She did cause contact. The relevant contact in the complaint to support the charge is distinct from the contact he decided to make with her (to grab her arms IIRC)

Nice try, but you are wrong. Caused contact means exactly what it says. The cop grabbed Carol, not the other way around. Try actually reading the Probable Cause Statement. Debi Wade, the author of it, admits she didn't witness Carol do anything -- rather, she was "advised" by an unnamed person. You say. "He [Lynn?] describes that contact in sufficient detail to support the charge." Lynn doesn't describe it at all. Debi Wade describes it, based on the word of an unknown "adviser." That does not come close to supporting probable cause, and it violates Carol's Sixth Amendment right to confront her accuser.

In essence there is no accuser in this case. Jeremy Lynn doesn't accuse Carol of assault and neither does Debi Wade. No known person accuses Carol of anything. No named person says Carol pushed against a door, touched Jeremy Lynn, or did anything that remotely constitutes a crime. On top of that, you are just pulling a lot of stuff out of your ass. Even the "adviser" doesn't claim Carol "flailed," or "kicked," or "bumped" anyone. You must be a cop because you sure lie and make stuff up like one.

Finally, Carol is charged with assaulting an officer, not "fighting the restraint" or "failing to submit" or whatever else you can find in your anal cavity. She's not charged with "resisting" because she wasn't under arrest. You should apply at the Greene County Sheriff's Office because your utter lack of knowledge about the law matches theirs. Even if she touched a door, and no named person claims she did, she made contact with her own door, not Jeremy Lynn. If you think that qualifies as an "assault" under Missouri law, you truly are out to lunch.

The essence of the assault claim, under Missouri law, is who caused contact with whom. Jeremy Lynn admits he grabbed Carol, and you seem to admit the same thing -- that he grabbed her and tried to restrain her, even though his own words show she was trying to get away from him.

I notice that you don't cite any law to support your contentions, and that's because there isn't any.

Here are two words to describe you and your comment -- weak and pathetic (and pitiful, make that three words). If you want to try to defend your position, contact me by private email or phone, and I will be glad to discuss. Look forward to hearing from you.

Yes, trying to push an officer back by whacking him with a door can be a crime. But after gaining entry, and making the choice to restrain Carol, even if he makes "first contact" if she kicks, pushes, or throws her body weight against him in an attempt to get away, that is "causing contact." This is what is alleged to have occurred, and it is a sufficient basis to charge. Causing contact isn't limited to initiating contact, and the officer initiating contact doesn't excuse any pushing, kicking, or bumping or other fighting on Carol's part. If the officer had a good faith basis to enter the premises and restrain Carol, her fighting back in the ways described is a crime, even if the officer isn't hurt.

Here's a question that changes nothing, but which you have never fully explained. What did Carol,think she was going to accomplish by pushing, kicking, and throwing her weight against the officer attempting to restrain her? Or even fighting against the door, for that matter? She had to have understood that the officers would gain entry and that barricading or shutting the door against the officers was of no practical use. These are officers who believed they were there to carry out a court ordered eviction, and who had received information that you were potentially dangerous. What was the rational, practical benefit to be gained by her reaction? A better way to deal with the situation would have been to begin preparing to move, since it was clear the landlord wanted you to leave (and you weren't even paying rent.) You could have sued for damages after the fact if they breached your lease, you know.

Caused contact does not mean initiated, it means caused. You cause contact if you deliberately push someone, or put your hands on them. Every time she threw her weight against him or pushed him would be "causing contact." It's not a game of who started, it's did she deliberately make contact with the officer. You can ask her public defender.

Back for more, I see, and still no citations to law to support anything you say. Gee, that's a surprise. A few points:

(1) You admit the officer initiated (caused) contact. Good deal. For those who know Missouri law, that means case closed.

(2) You describe Carol pushing, kicking, putting force on door etc. Please give the name of the person who witnessed this and put it in the Probable Cause Statement.

(3) You ask about why Carol "fought against the door," etc. You seem to accept that as true. Please provide the name of the person who witnessed those events and provided that information?

(4) Why do I need to ask a public defender anything? You've made no citation to law to ask about. Give me a citation to law, and I'll be glad to ask about it.

(5) Why haven't you contacted me for discussion? I made that good-faith offer, but it's been "crickets" from you. Why?

There was evidence indicating that the victim of the assault had arrested or was attempting to arrest Appellant when Appellant launched himself backwards into the deputy, knocking him off his feet and into a ditch. It is certainly reasonable to infer that the officer did not give his consent to being knocked down, as well as consent to other physical contact upon himself.

We do not view the State's two witnesses as being in direct contradiction, as one was not sure how the contact was initiated, but the other witness was.

Ms. Hord testified that, at some time during the late afternoon or evening hours on that day, J.D.B. and two of his friends, wearing Halloween masks, surrounded her car and "gyrat[ed] their hips in a sexual manner." Ms. Hord became "upset" and left to run errands. Later that evening, at approximately 8:20, Ms. Hord again encountered the three teens while she was outside near her mailbox. When she saw them approaching, Ms. Hord got in her car and locked the doors. She testified that the boys again surrounded her car, this time holding the masks in their hands and also one of the boys "[n]ot J.D.B., [a]nother one" was carrying a plastic "machete."Ms. Hord testified the boys were again gyrating their hips and that J.D.B. was right next to her driver's side window "pumping his hips right into the car, so the car was moving."

This court has previously defined physical contact sufficient to constitute an assault as "the touching of the person of another or something so intimately associated with, or attached to his person to be regarded as a part thereof."State v. Greathouse, 789 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Mo.App., 1990).

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the judgment, the only possible evidence of contact between Ms. Hord and J.D.B. was Ms. Hord's testimony that the juvenile was pushing against her car in such a manner that the car was moving. There is also J.D.B.'s testimony that he would apologize for scratching Ms. Hord's vehicle, which he then claimed was done not by him but by another of the juveniles. There is no evidence in the record of any contact that J.D.B. had with Ms. Hord's actual person. In order to support a conviction under this theory of assault, it must be found that the juvenile's contact with Ms. Hord's car was with something so intimately associated with or attached to her as to be considered a part of her person. The juvenile officer cites to no authority that would support such a finding, and this court can find no such Missouri authority.

Beverly Young Nelson and attorney Gloria Allred (From cnn.com)

Roy Moore (From aol.com)

The classified briefings that the C.I.A. held in August and September for the so-called Gang of Eight — the Republican and Democratic leaders of the House and the Senate and of the intelligence committees in each chamber — show deep concerns about the impact of the election meddling.

In the briefings, the C.I.A. said there was intelligence indicating not only that the Russians were trying to get Mr. Trump elected but that they had gained computer access to multiple state and local election boards in the United States since 2014, officials said.

Although the breached systems were not involved in actual vote-tallying operations, Obama administration officials proposed that the eight senior lawmakers write a letter to state election officials warning them of the possible threat posed by Russian hacking, officials said.

But Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the Republican majority leader, resisted, questioning the underpinnings of the intelligence, according to officials with knowledge of the discussions.

(From stltoday.com)

Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals, based in Staines-upon-Thames, England, with its U.S. headquarters in St. Louis, Missouri, produces specialty pharmaceutical products, including generic drugs and imaging agents.

Mallinckrodt manufactures and distributes products used in diagnostic procedures and in the treatment of pain and related conditions. This includes the development, manufacture and distribution of specialty pharmaceuticals, active pharmaceutical ingredients, contrast products and radiopharmaceuticals. The company employs 5,500 at 47 locations around the world. Net sales were $2 billion in 2011.

Mallinckrodt Chief Executive Mark Trudeau's pay jumped 29 percent to $12.6 million as the company rewarded him for a year when profits more than doubled.

Mallinckrodt, a drug company that is legally Irish but has its headquarters in Hazelwood, disclosed details of its executive pay in a proxy statement last week.

Trudeau's pay included a salary of $1.04 million and a bonus of $1.6 million, which was 127 percent of the target amount. He also received $5.9 million in stock and $3.9 million in options, with some of the stock depending on Mallinckrodt's revenue growth and total shareholder return between 2016 and 2018.

An earlier stock award, from 2014, paid out at 200 percent of its targeted amount. That brought Trudeau shares worth $2.5 million at current prices.

Trudeau also received $101,003 in contributions to a supplemental savings plan and $16,535 in tax reimbursement. The tax reimbursement was for executives whose spouses or partners attended a national sales conference.

Mallinckrodt's earnings per share more than doubled during fiscal 2016, which ended Sept. 30. Its share price rose 9 percent.

Trudeau's golden parachute, the amount he would receive if he leaves Mallinckrodt after a takeover, is valued at $26.7 million.

Mr. Shuler,

As the General Counsel for Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals, I'm responding to your email to Mark C. Trudeau, dated October 30, 2017. This communication is to inform you that Mallinckrodt, amongst other measures, has completed a forensic analysis of both the data released to the public following the hack of Ashley Madison and the content of the website since the date it was hacked. By that analysis, the company has verified that Mr. Trudeau has never had any experience with Ashley Madison or that company's website. He has not registered nor in any way made any use of the website. Therefore, the content of your email is either a case of mistaken identity or someone impersonating Mr. Trudeau as a serious prank. In either case, the allegations you intend to make are not true. If you recheck the facts, you will be forced to come to the same conclusion.

I ask that you refrain from publishing your inaccurate story, which could be damaging to Mr. Trudeau's reputation. Should you persist in your plan, you will be liable for defamation under the law.


Sincerely,
Michael-Bryant Hicks
General Counsel
Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals

Paul Weeks and son

A security is a fungible, negotiable financial instrument that holds some type of monetary value. It represents an ownership position in a publicly-traded corporation (via stock), a creditor relationship with a governmental body or a corporation (represented by owning that entity's bond), or rights to ownership as represented by an option.

The securities-fraud charge grew from a 2009 private-loan transaction between Weeks and a personal acquaintance. Weeks borrowed $200,000, signing and delivering to the private lender a personal promissory note. Over the next two years, Weeks incurred severe financial losses in the stock market and could not repay the note on schedule.

According to one Missouri law book, there is "little Missouri case law" on the subject of criminal securities fraud prosecutions, because only a "few" criminal securities fraud cases have ever been prosecuted in Missouri. 1A MISSOURI PRACTICE, Methods of Practice: Transaction Guide, sec. 27.40, p. 185 (3d ed., 1992). 

As late as 1995, a Missouri court acknowledged there was "no Missouri case law" on the legal standard necessary to prove a securities law prosecution in Missouri. Dumke, 901 S.W. at 102.

Many courts have ruled that promissory notes used in personal one-on-one transactions are not securities. 

Indeed, when the United State Congress enacted the federal securities laws back in the 1930s, Congress made it expressly clear that personal and commercial promissory notes were not securities; were not to be treated as securities; and, that Congress did not intend for personal or commercial promissory notes to be treated as securities.

More disturbing is that in Missouri, other than the Weeks prosecution, there are no cases reported in which a person has been criminally charged and prosecuted for "securities fraud" for having signed a promissory note in a private transaction an then failing to repay the note. Paul Weeks appears to be the only person ever prosecuted in Missouri for having signed a personal promissory note, in a private transaction, and then failing to pay.

Official court statistics in Missouri confirm that it is virtually impossible for a person to be prosecuted . . . for having signed a promissory note and then failing to repay. According to the Missouri Office of State Courts Administrators, since 2006 there have been 63,101 civil cases filed in Missouri courts . . . in which the complainant alleged that the defendant had signed a promissory note but failed to repay. Yet, not one of those 63,101 cases appears to have resulted in a criminal "securities fraud" prosecution . . .  

Statistically, this means that every person in Missouri who signs a promissory note, but fails to repay it, faces a virtually zero chance of ever being prosecuted for alleged "securities fraud."The statistical probability of being prosecuted in Missouri for signing a promissory note, but not repaying it, is numerically measured to be 0.000015% -- meaning that the probability of facing a criminal prosecution in Missouri [on such a matter] is so infinitesimally small that there is a zero to the left of the decimal point, and four zeros to the right of the decimal. The probability is very close to zero -- and it gets even closer to zero considering that only a few criminal securities prosecutions have been filed in Missouri since 1928. 

In Missouri, the statute of limitations for alleged "securities fraud" is three years. The charge against Weeks is based on a private loan transaction that occurred in August 2009. Therefore, simple math would indicate that the statute of limitations in the Weeks case expired in August 2012, At that point, a Missouri prosecutor is required by . . . law, not to comment a prosecution barred by the statute of limitations. . . .  

But [Chris] Koster and the Missouri Attorney General's Office filed their untimely prosecution against Weeks anyway. These Missouri officials commenced their prosectuion against Weeks on Dec. 24, 2014 -- some 30 days after the three-year statute of limitations had already run. 

Tommy Gallion

This whole ploy was undertaken to take over gambling in Alabama and to line the pockets of Congressman [Bob] Riley and his political minors if he was elected governor. After Riley was elected governor, he immediately moved to close down the legally operating casinos in order to remove all competition for the benefit of the Choctaw Indian casino operation slightly over the Alabama line in Mississippi and later the Poarch Creek Indian casino in Alabama. 

I have been a Republican since 1972 and have been involved with the Republican Party since that time. In 1984, I was a delegate for the Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas, for re-election that nominated Ronald Reagan. I was on the Convention Committee for the Republican National Convention in New Orleans that nominated George H.W. Bush for president in 1988. I was also appointed legal counsel for the Republican National Committee from Alabama for roughly five years and was Ballot Security Co-Chairman for the Alabama Republican Party in the State of Alabama for several state and national elections. I remain a Republican to this day. 

My father was twice elected attorney general of Alabama, and my father-in-law died while serving many years on the Alabama Supreme Court. I consider the political prosecution of Don Siegelman and others by these newly elected Republicans to be so corrupt that I ceased to support anything to do with these facinorous cretins who were corruptly using political prosecutions solely for money and power.

Peter S. Blasi and family (From facebook.com)

Peter S. Blasi, heads the firm’s workers’ compensation and employment practice group. In addition, Peter maintains a diverse civil litigation practice handling both plaintiff and defendant personal injury, workers' compensation, employment and title insurance litigation claims. Peter has successfully represented hundreds of clients for over decade before the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, Missouri Division of Workers Compensation and the Illinois Department of Human Rights. Mr. Blasi has taken hundreds of cases to trial, hearing and or appeal including cases addressing first impression issues involving independent contractor/employee issues and joint contribution amongst employers. Peter has secured millions of dollars in benefits for his employee clients over the years as well as save his employer clients from paying out large awards on questionable claims.

(From haikudeck.com)

Whenever any rent has become due and payable, and payment has been demanded by the landlord or the landlord's agent from the lessee or person occupying the premises, and payment thereof has not been made, the landlord or agent may file a statement, verified by affidavit, with any associate circuit judge in the county in which the property is situated, setting forth the terms on which such property was rented, and the amount of rent actually due to such landlord; that the rent has been demanded from the tenant, lessee or person occupying the premises, and that payment has not been made, and substantially describing the property rented or leased.

Any judgment, other than a default judgment, becomes final after 30 days. After a judgment becomes final, the writ of restitution can be issued to the Deputy Sheriff.

To terminate a month-to-month tenancy, you must provide the tenant(s) with one month’s notice, calculated from a rent paying date. For example, if rent is due on the 1st day of each month, the Landlord must give notice on July 1st to terminate on July 31st. The Law Offices of Anderson and Associates will file your eviction on August 1st. If the Landlord gives notice on July 5th, he cannot terminate until August 31st.

Note: The seal of the Greene County Circuit Court MUST be affixed for this Execution to be valid.

On May 23, 1957, three Cleveland police officers arrived at appellant's residence in that city pursuant to information that "a person [was] hiding out in the home, who was wanted for questioning in connection with a recent bombing, and that there was a large amount of policy paraphernalia being hidden in the home." Miss Mapp and her daughter by a former marriage lived on the top floor of the two-family dwelling. Upon their arrival at that house, the officers knocked on the door and demanded entrance, but appellant, after telephoning her attorney, refused to admit them without a search warrant. They advised their headquarters of the situation and undertook a surveillance of the house.

The officers again sought entrance some three hours later when four or more additional officers arrived on the scene. When Miss Mapp did not come to the door immediately, at least one of the several doors to the house was forcibly opened . . .  and the policemen gained admittance. Meanwhile Miss Mapp's attorney arrived, but the officers, having secured their own entry, and continuing in their defiancé of the law, would permit him neither to see Miss Mapp nor to enter the house. It appears that Miss Mapp was halfway down the stairs from the upper floor to the front door when the officers, in this highhanded manner, broke into the hall. She demanded to see the search warrant. A paper, claimed to be a warrant, was held up by one of the officers. She grabbed the "warrant" and placed it in her bosom. A struggle ensued in which the officers recovered the piece of paper and as a result of which they handcuffed appellant because she had been "belligerent" in resisting their official rescue of the "warrant" from her person.

Running roughshod over appellant, a policeman "grabbed" her, "twisted [her] hand," and she "yelled [and] pleaded with him" because "it was hurting." Appellant, in handcuffs, was then forcibly taken upstairs to her bedroom where the officers searched a dresser, a chest of drawers, a closet and some suitcases. They also looked into a photo album and through personal papers belonging to the appellant. The search spread to the rest of the second floor including the child's bedroom, the living room, the kitchen and a dinette. The basement of the building and a trunk found therein were also searched. The obscene materials for possession of which she was ultimately convicted were discovered in the course of that widespread search.

At the trial, no search warrant was produced by the prosecution, nor was the failure to produce one explained or accounted for. At best, "There is, in the record, considerable doubt as to whether there ever was any warrant for the search of defendant's home" . . . . The Ohio Supreme Court believed a "reasonable argument" could be made that the conviction should be reversed "because the methods' employed to obtain the [evidence] . . . were such as to 'offend "a sense of justice,"'" but the court found determinative the fact that the evidence had not been taken "from defendant's person by the use of brutal or offensive physical force against defendant." . . .

We held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, that the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the States by reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But a majority held that the exclusionary rule of the Weeks case was not required of the States, that they could apply such sanctions as they chose. That position had the necessary votes to carry the day. But, with all respect, it was not the voice of reason or principle.

As stated in the Weeks case, if evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment can be used against an accused, "his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and . . . might as well be stricken from the Constitution."232 U.S. at 393.

When we allowed States to give constitutional sanction to the "shabby business" of unlawful entry into a home . . . , we did indeed rob the Fourth Amendment of much meaningful force. . . .

Without judicial action making the exclusionary rule applicable to the States, Wolf v. Colorado, in practical effect, reduced the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures to "a dead letter" . . .

Patty Poe (From facebook.com)

Appellant [Mapp] stands convicted of knowingly having had in her possession and under her control certain lewd and lascivious books, pictures, and photographs in violation of . . . of Ohio's Revised Code.As officially stated in the syllabus to its opinion, the Supreme Court of Ohio found that her conviction was valid though "based primarily upon the introduction in evidence of lewd and lascivious books and pictures unlawfully seized during an unlawful search of defendant's home . . . ."

Todd and Paula Wiesehan (From facebook.com)

I am a Planner and serve as the Planning and Zoning Department Administrator for the unincorporated portion of Christian County Missouri. My mission is to lead my department with an eye toward guided and organized development which is in line with the vision set forth in our comprehensive plan. I supervise a staff of five and work closely with our County Commission as well as our appointed Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of Adjustment. I also serve as the County's representative on numerous local and regional planning organizations.

The county had a population of 54,285 in 2000 census. According to the 2010 census, the county's population is 77,422 (a 42.6 percentage increase from 2000 census), making it the fastest growing county in Missouri and one of the fastest growing in the nation as the county becomes more suburban as growth continues in Springfield. Its county seat is Ozark. The county was organized in 1859 and is named after William Christian, a Kentucky soldier of the American Revolutionary War.

Christian County is part of the Springfield Metropolitan Statistical Area.

I understand that you are going to publish whatever you deem appropriate for your story. For my part, all I can say is that, between the end of my first marriage and prior to meeting my current wife, I explored several typical dating websites, and out of curiosity (and perhaps hurt/anger), looked into this one. I’m sure this sounds naive, but as a recent victim of infidelity myself at that moment in my life, it was worth a few bucks just to see if what this site was advertising could even be real and that so many people were doing what was done to me. I never met or communicated with anyone as a result of giving the site my information and creating a profile. I basically concluded that it was mainly a creepy scam and moved on, somewhat encouraged that I could trust again.

I have never cheated on my past or present spouse or with another married person during that period when I was single – and I never will. Again, I do understand the intent of your series of articles and I do regret the mistake of ever clicking on that popup ad. Beyond that, I have no guilt or apology to make to my wife or anyone else in relation to that website.

Patricia Poe

4. The director and defenders shall provide legal services to an eligible person:

(2) Who is detained or charged with a misdemeanor which will probably result in confinement in the county jail upon conviction, including appeals from a conviction in such a case, unless the prosecuting or circuit attorney has waived a jail sentence;

Carol Tovich Shuler

Attorneys, judges, legislators and advocacy groups worked eight years to develop the measure. The legislation streamlines existing criminal statutes, creates new classes of felonies and misdemeanors and boosts sentences for drunken drivers who kill someone.

It also has been touted as tough on crimes against children by increasing the number of felony child molestation charges and adding incest as an aggravating factor in child sex abuse cases. It also eliminates the possibility of jail time for first-time offenders convicted of possessing 10 grams or less of marijuana.

At one point, both sides of the courtroom — lawyers who prosecute crime and lawyers who defend alleged offenders — pored through the state’s crime laws word by word, line by line.

The result of that is a lot of cleanup and consolidation, such as condensing Missouri’s 25 assault statutes, said Sen. Bob Dixon, R-Springfield, who co-sponsored the package.

No offense committed and no fine, penalty or forfeiture incurred, or prosecution commenced or pending previous to or at the time when any statutory provision is repealed or amended, shall be affected by the repeal or amendment, but the trial and punishment of all such offenses, and the recovery of the fines, penalties or forfeitures shall be had, in all respects, as if the provision had not been repealed or amended, except that all such proceedings shall be conducted according to existing procedural laws.

A prosecution is commenced for a misdemeanor or infraction when the information is filed . . .

In arguing that section 565.083.1(5) is unconstitutionally vague, Jones offers the hypothetical situation of a citizen who pats a police officer on the back or who taps a police officer on the shoulder, and the hypothetical situation of a handcuffed prisoner who is stumbling down the courthouse steps and grabs a law enforcement officer in order to avoid falling. Jones argues that such conduct might be a violation of the terms of section 565.083.1(5), and therefore the statute fails to give adequate notice of the type of conduct which it proscribes. Jones also contends that such uncertainty makes the statute susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

However, a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge the facial validity of that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in situations not before the court.Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-611, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); State v. Worthington, 582 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Mo.App.1979). A defendant may not espouse the cause of differently situated persons as a defense in a prosecution where the statute clearly applies to him.

Spencer P. Desai (From carmodymacdonald.com)

Spencer P. Desai has more than 25 years of experience in bankruptcy law. He has focused his practice on bankruptcy, business reorganization, business loan workouts, debtor/creditor rights, Chapter 7 and 11 bankruptcy, and commercial litigation. His representation of corporate and individual borrowers includes bankruptcy proceedings, workouts, defense of fraud and collection actions and asset protection planning. Mr. Desai has advocated for banks and lenders on a wide array of issues, including loan enforcement, workouts, lender liability defense, prosecution of fraud actions, and stay relief and other matters in the United States Bankruptcy Courts. He has also represented a broad diversity of other constituencies including Chapter 7 trustees, creditors’ committees, lessors, and business acquirers.

Spencer Desai home in Chesterfield, MO (From realtor.com)

Grand brick and stone manse located in prestigious Greystone. 1.5 story on private lushly landscaped corner lot with in-ground pool. Enjoy Schierholz quality and design: dramatic tall ceilings, 4 extra large bedrooms on second floor plus main floor master suite, paneled office, extensive millwork with trayed and vaulted ceilings throughout, wood floors, French doors and so much more. Gourmet kitchen and breakfast room surrounded by tall arched windows - including Viking range, Sub-Zero refrigerator, granite countertops, cozy window seat and an adjoining two-story hearth room with impressive fireplace. Elegant dining and living rooms with floor to ceiling windows and limestone fireplace. High pour finished walk out lower level for family fun with cherry bar, cedar and wine closets, billiard area, mirrored fitness room and full bath. Low maintenance deck and private pool patio complete the resort-style feel of this elegant and family-friendly home. Experience the luxury you deserve!

Patty Poe

Castle Doctrine does not apply in Carol's case. Pursuant to RSMo 563.031 law enforcement are exempt from the protections of the castle doctrine. What matters is were the law enforcement officers reasonably believe they are executing an arrest (RSMo 563.046). In Carol's case, based on the execution for possession, the law enforcement officers thought they were reasonably executing an arrest for trespass.

The comminuted fracture in Carol Shuler's left arm, courtesy of Missouri deputies.

On September 9, 2015, we responded to 4070 S. Fort to execute a Writ of Execution and Court Order (1531-                                                           ACO4535) to remove lessee Roger Shuler from the                                                             rental.

Greg Schiano (From Associated Press)

Court documents released in the summer of 2016 included a deposition from former Penn State assistant coach Mike McQueary, who indicated former Penn State assistant Tom Bradley said Schiano went to him in the early 1990s "white as a ghost and said he just saw Jerry doing something to a boy in the shower."

Doug Jones and Don Siegelman (with daughter Dana and wife Lori) (By Amy E. Voigt)

A federal judge ordered Jones off the Siegelman case because of his involvement in related cases during his time as U.S. attorney. Even though he did not represent Siegelman in 2007, Jones still spoke out against his conviction at the (Judiciary Committee) hearing about selective prosecution.

Other than an initial contact with the Government to make sure that they were not going to seek arrest and perp walk the Governor, I had nothing to do with the defense of the Birmingham case. The Government made it clear from the outset that they were going to seek to have me recused because of my involvement in allowing the case to go forward against Dr. Bobo when I was U. S. Attorney. While I disagreed with that position, the Court ultimately held that I was precluded from representing the Governor in that particular matter.

Because of a trial conflict in the spring of 2006, and the Governor’s insistence on a speedy trial before June 2006 primary, I had no real choice but to withdraw as lead counsel. However, facing incredible challenges in sifting through mountains of discovery in a short period of time, Gov. Siegelman was the beneficiary of exceptional legal talent lead by attorneys Vince Kilborn, David McDonald and Redding Pitt. But at the end of the day, despite acquittals on an overwhelming number of the charges, matters involving Mr. Scrushy and one obstruction of justice count did stick, and Gov. Siegelman was convicted. As you are aware, following sentencing, an appeal bond was denied and he was shackled and taken into custody from the courtroom.

Patty Poe

Castle Doctrine does not apply in Carol's case. Pursuant to RSMo 563.031 law enforcement are exempt from the protections of the castle doctrine. What matters is were the law enforcement officers reasonably believe they are executing an arrest (RSMo 563.046). In Carol's case, based on the execution for possession, the law enforcement officers thought they were reasonably executing an arrest for trespass.

Our research on the Indiana and Missouri laws shows that, while the language varies between the two, the main difference is this: The Indiana law specifically includes public servants (law-enforcement officers, etc.) among those against whom physical force can be used when they appear to unlawfully be entering a residence. The Missouri law, on the other hand, does not exclude law enforcement types from being the targets of physical force under such circumstances.

Both laws also allow for the use of deadly force against cops who appear to be making unlawful intrusions into a residence. Bottom line: It's a bad idea for cops in Indiana or Missouri to enter a residence without knowing for sure they have lawful grounds to be there.

563.031. Use of force in defense of persons. — 1. A person may, subject to the provisions of subsection 2 of this section, use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such force to be necessary to defend himself or herself or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful force by such other person, unless:

  (1) The actor was the initial aggressor; except that in such case his or her use of force is nevertheless justifiable provided:

  (a) He or she has withdrawn from the encounter and effectively communicated such withdrawal to such other person but the latter persists in continuing the incident by the use or threatened use of unlawful force; or

  (b) He or she is a law enforcement officer and as such is an aggressor pursuant to section 563.046;

563.046. Law enforcement officer's use of force in making an arrest.— 1. A law enforcement officer need not retreat or desist from efforts to effect the arrest, or from efforts to prevent the escape from custody, of a person he or she reasonably believes to have committed an offense because of resistance or threatened resistance of the arrestee. In addition to the use of physical force authorized under other sections of this chapter, a law enforcement officer is, subject to the provisions of subsections 2 and 3, justified in the use of such physical force as he or she reasonably believes is immediately necessary to effect the arrest or to prevent the escape from custody.

The use of any physical force in making an arrest is not justified under this section unless the arrest is lawful or the law enforcement officer reasonably believes the arrest is lawful, and the amount of physical force used was objectively reasonable in light of the totality of the particular facts and circumstances confronting the officer on the scene, without regard to the officer’s underlying intent or motivation.