Matt Pit

Bob Riley

What led to Matt Pitt's legal problems? Our sources point to three key events:

(1) Political figures, apparently with ties to Riley and Bryant, encouraged Pitt to use The Basement to endorse a slate of white, conservative political candidates;

(2) Business figures encouraged Pitt to do the ministry's banking with Bryant Bank;

(3) Pitt and a few associates were invited to attend a University of Alabama football game and sit in Bryant's private box. During the game, a Bryant crony was heard to say, after looking out over the packed stadium, "Can you imagine this many people pay us to watch n-----s beat up on each other?"

Pitt rebuffed the first two entreaties and was so disgusted by No. 3 that he decided to have nothing to do with Paul Bryant Jr. or his bank.

Before long, Pitt was in trouble with the law because of an honorary sheriff's badge that he never asked for--Jefferson County Sheriff Mike Hale, an ally of Rob Riley (the former governor's son), gave it to him.

Can you imagine this many people pay us to watch n-----s beat up on each other?

Paul Bryant Jr.

The shooting of Walter Scott in South Carolina

[Scott] had been arrested multiple times in the past on contempt-of-court charges stemming from child-support obligations he had missed, and he knew all too well the criminal repercussions he was facing: arrest; a few rushed minutes in court, at best, without a lawyer and without the presumption of innocence (because it would be a civil proceeding); jail time; and another mark against him on his permanent record.

Ted Rollins, former CEO of Campus Crest Communities

Not only did Scott's own experience suggest that arrest and jail time can result from child-support debt, but the statistics tell us the likelihood is high that a black, working-class man like him would get thrown in jail for such a reason.

In South Carolina, at least one in eight people in jail are there on contempt-of-court charges related to late or unpaid child-support orders. Nationally, as many as 50,000 parents may be in jail on those charges, though the exact number is uncertain, mainly because "contempt of court" is a general charge that does not only apply to child support cases. The best available data suggest that a majority of these jailed parents are black fathers.

"On top of all the other things that go through your head as a black man in an encounter with a police officer," says Jacquelyn Boggess, the Co-Director of the Center for Family Policy and Practice and an expert on child support, "you have to be thinking about your child support debt, because that's one of the big reasons that black men spend time in jail."

Wind Creek Casino in Wetumpka, Alabama

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, as we must in light of the verdict . . . , we assume that the jury found that petitioner accepted the cash knowing that it was intended to ensure that he would vote in favor of the rezoning application and that he would try to persuade his fellow commissioners to do likewise. Thus, although petitioner did not initiate the transaction, his acceptance of the bribe constituted an implicit promise to use his official position to serve the interests of the bribegiver.

In affirming petitioner's conviction, the Court of Appeals noted that the instruction did not require the jury to find that petitioner had demanded or requested the money, or that he had conditioned the performance of any official act upon its receipt. . . . The Court of Appeals held, however, that "passive acceptance of a benefit by a public official is sufficient to form the basis of a Hobbs Act violation if the official knows that he is being offered the payment in exchange for a specific requested exercise of his official power. The official need not take any specific action to induce the offering of the benefit."

We reject petitioner's criticism of the instruction, and conclude that it satisfies the quid pro quo requirement of [McCormick], because the offense is completed at the time when the public official receives a payment in return for his agreement to perform specific official acts; fulfillment of the quid pro quo is not an element of the offense. We also reject petitioner's contention that an affirmative step is an element of the offense of extortion "under color of official right" and need be included in the instruction. As we explained above, our construction of the statute is informed by the common-law tradition from which the term of art was drawn and understood. We hold today that the Government need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.

It is a "basic principle of Fourth Amendment law" that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. . . . It is one thing to seize without a warrant property resting in an open area or seizable by levy without an intrusion into privacy, and it is quite another thing to effect a warrantless seizure of property, even that owned by a corporation, situated on private premises to which access is not otherwise available for the seizing officer.

As the late Judge Leventhal recognized, this distinction has equal force when the seizure of a person is involved. Writing on the constitutional issue now before us for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit sitting en banc, Dorman v. United States, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 313, 435 F.2d 385 (1970), Judge Leventhal first noted the settled rule that warrantless arrests in public places are valid. He immediately recognized, however, that "a greater burden is placed . . . on officials who enter a home or dwelling without consent. Freedom from intrusion into the home or dwelling is the archetype of the privacy protection secured by the Fourth Amendment."

Alabama deputy Chris Blevins

Mike Hubbard

It’s widely rumored on Goat Hill that Hubbard has already negotiated a secret deal with PCI which would allow the tribe to continue its gambling monopoly in Alabama. That should come as no surprise, since Hubbard has long-standing financial ties to PCI. Another rumor circulating this week was the PCI have offered to pay Hubbard’s legal defense bill, for assurances Marsh’s bill doesn’t pass the House.

It was widely reported after the 2010 election cycle by publications such as Politico, the Birmingham News, AL.com and The Montgomery Independent that $550,000 in campaign contributions from PCI were laundered through the Republican State Leadership Committee in Washington into political action committees in Alabama controlled by Hubbard.

The political commentary show, Voice of Alabama Politics, has moved from its Sunday morning time on ABC, to Sunday evening on Alabama Cable Network.

“Speaker Hubbard has used his considerable political influence to warn people off of advertising on our show because he wants to muzzle anyone who will report or speak about his leadership,” host Bill Britt told his viewers this week.

The V can now be seen every Sunday at 6:30 PM on Charter Cable channel 80 as well as every Sunday morning on YouTube.

Britt, a constant critic of Speaker Mike Hubbard, when asked by IAP if it was his understanding Hubbard directed the Poarch Creek Indians to stop advertising on The V, he responded, “that is what I was told as to why they pulled their advertising. Jim Barton (a principal with the lobbying firm Barton and Kinney LLC, who represent the PCI) delivered the message from Hubbard to the tribe is my understanding.”

Officer Chris Blevins (left) and yours truly after Blevins had finished "protecting my constitutional rights"

. . . the weak against oppression or intimidation, and the peaceful against violence or disorder. And respect the constitutional rights of all to liberty, equality, and justice.

Conducted a pretext traffic stop on the Shulers' blue Nissan after observing it roll thru stop sign at MacIan/Keith Drive; Stop was at North Shelby Library; warning issued for traffic violation and both parties were served with papers, which they discarded in the parking lot as they left.

A "pretext" or "pretextual" stop is a stop in which the officer detains the citizen for a minor crime (i.e. traffic offense) because the officer actually suspects the person of involvement in another, more significant crime (i.e. drug possession).

Comedian Chris Rock (From WhoSay)

The ruling in Whren v. U.S. demonstrates how easy it is for officers to [conduct pretext stops]. There are numerous minor infractions for which officers can legally pull over a car -- dirty license plate, broken tail light, changing lanes without signaling, loud muffler, etc. As such, officers frequently choose which cars to pull over based on suspicions that something more serious might be going on. Police officers make this decision based on age, race, and appearance. This is unconstitutional, but impossible to prove.

Missouri House Speaker John Diehl

Diehl acknowledged "making a serious error in judgment by sending the text messages" to the intern, who no longer works at the Capitol.

"I'm going to do what's best for the (House) body and the (Republican) caucus, and step aside out of my office," Diehl said in an interview with The Associated Press and reporters from three other media outlets.

"I made a mistake," Diehl said. "It's one that calls into question my ability to lead."

Intern Katie Graham (From Daily Mail)

Richard Miller, dean of the School of Arts and Sciences at Missouri Southern, told The Star that the school pulled its four interns out of the state Capitol this spring after an unspecified incident. Yet Miller, citing student privacy laws, declined to be more specific about what led the university to end the internships.

Missouri Southern has held a legislative internship program for the past 20 years, sending students to the United Nations in New York City and Washington, D.C.

“This is the first time we have pulled all the interns,” Miller said. “Usually, when something happens, it is a problem with the interns themselves, but that was not the situation this year.”

Screenshots of the text messages between Diehl and the intern are punctuated throughout with emoticons and emojis — cartoonish faces that smile or wink. They paint a picture of playful sexual innuendo.

Her: “You better take care of me.”

Diehl: “Like how?”

Her: “I’ll bet you’ll figure it out.”

Diehl: “I dunno. You have always been disappointed;)”

Her: “I just have high expectations, I guess. Thus far, you’ve done pretty well (an emoji blows a kiss)”

Diehl: “:). I kinda want to hear what you are expecting”

Then, shortly after, he types: “You will be in good hands :)”

At one point Diehl texts her “God I want you right now,” to which she replies “I wish you could have me right now.”

In another exchange, she sends a picture of herself in a bikini and Diehl responds: “Damn girl . . . ”

“Nice”

Shortly after he writes: “I want to see more” followed by a smiling emoji.

Another exchange centered on Diehl texting that he was “Laying in bed looking at your pic :)”

She responded: “Mmmmm why can’t I be there :)”

Mike Hubbard

Another week later, last Friday, [Diehl's] staff offered to deliver records for both his personal cellphone and another cellphone paid for by his law firm, Husch Blackwell. Those records took several days to produce. They showed just six text messages sent from the intern to Diehl.

While they were presented as evidence that no significant text exchange with the intern occurred, they show only a log of conventional text messages.

Yet the texts obtained by The Star and presented last month to Diehl show conversations over Apple’s proprietary iMessage platform. Texts on iMessage wouldn’t show up on a cellphone record unless they were sent or received when no Wi-Fi or mobile Internet connection is available.

Neither Diehl nor his staff ever mentioned that he regularly uses iMessage to send texts until asked by The Star on Tuesday.

Don Siegelman

Siegelman points to no prejudice he suffered as a result of Canary's communications. He provides the court with no credible evidence that the United States Attorney directed, managed, influenced or controlled any aspect of the prosecution of the case.

In Harris, we stated that "where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry."

Here, Siegelman not only provided specific allegations, but also actual evidence, which the Magistrate Judge and Judge (Mark) Fuller ignored, that discovery would have yielded facts supporting his new-trial claim. In addition to the emails showing Canary’s ongoing involvement, Siegelman’s discovery request was supported by Grimes’s letter to the Attorney General, in which she wrote that Canary “directed some action” in the case, made “suggestions” to Franklin, and wrote “all the press releases” issued under Franklin’s signature. . . . The district court could have sought testimony or evidence from Grimes—but did not. Siegelman also pointed to the FOIA suit, which turned up more than 500 pages of responsive documents relating to Canary’s disqualification. . . . The district court could have ordered the government to turn over these documents—but did not.

Most importantly, the district court could have ordered the government to disclose post-disqualification communications between Canary and the prosecution team regarding the Siegelman case—but did not. . . . A simple, targeted email search using terms such as “Leura” and “Canary” with “Siegelman” and “the Big Case” would have quickly answered whether Canary’s ongoing involvement was as extensive as Grimes claimed; if necessary, any responsive emails could have been reviewed in camera. Instead, the Magistrate Judge ordered no Canary-related discovery, based on his conclusion that Siegelman had “pointed to no prejudice he suffered as a result of Canary’s” involvement. . . . But a showing of prejudice is not required for a discovery request, which is proper if the defendant can provide “reason to believe” that his new-trial claim would be substantiated “if the facts are fully developed.” Arthur, 452 F.3d at 1247 (emphasis added). This error alone requires reversal, so that Siegelman’s discovery request can be evaluated under the proper standard. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”)

Claud Neilson

TCVA argues that the probate court lacked personal jurisdiction over TCVA because TCVA was not named as a party in the probate proceeding and was not served with notice of the proceeding in the probate court. We observe that TCVA maintains that it was never served with process of the proceeding in the probate court or provided with proper notice of that proceeding. This Court has held: . . .

"When the service of process on the defendant is contested as being improper or invalid, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove that service of process was performed correctly and legally."Ex parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d 880, 884 (Ala. 1983).

Mr. Morris, as administrator of the estate opened in the probate court, has not alleged any facts before this Court that would prove that he served the conservatorship, nor has he contested TCVA's allegation as to the absence of service of process. It is axiomatic that a court does not obtain personal jurisdiction over a party upon which service of process has not been perfected and proper notice has not been provided. Because there is no evidence before this Court that the conservatorship ever received service of process or proper notice, the probate court does not have personal jurisdiction over the conservatorship, and its orders directed to the conservatorship are void and due to be vacated.

Mike Hubbard mailer from the 2014 campaign

Britt reports that Rob Riley and others are taking extraordinary steps to undermine the investigation. At the heart of the scheme is a game of legal musical chairs, with Rob Riley and Bill Baxley representing multiple clients in an apparent effort to use attorney-client privilege as a way to get inside information.

(d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule:

(1) FURTHERANCE OF CRIME OR FRAUD. If the services of the attorney were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud;

First, the lawyer may not counsel or assist a client in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2(d). Similarly, a lawyer has a duty under Rule 3.3(a)(3) not to use false evidence. This duty is essentially a special instance of the duty prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) to avoid assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct. . . .

If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially furthering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw . . . 

Don Siegelman

A federal appeals court Wednesday denied former Gov. Don Siegelman's bid for a new trial, saying he relied on arguments that judges rejected in an appeal from his co-defendant in their 2006 trial on bribery and corruption charges.

Siegelman argued that the district court should have considered whether then-U.S. Attorney Leura Canary, who recused herself from Siegelman's investigation in 2002, had honored the recusal. Former HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy made the same arguments in his motion for a new trial, citing emails from a whistleblowers in which Canary suggested a gag order be placed on Siegelman during the trial; forwarded an email on its coverage and approved a staffing decision.

The three-judge panel rejected Scrushy's argument in 2013, writing "there is no evidence that Canary's emails influenced any decisions made by the U.S. Attorney's office in prosecuting Scrushy." In the former governor's case, the court wrote that it had to follow its decision on Scrushy.

"Regardless of whether Canary possessed a stronger conflict of interest with respect to Siegelman, our determination in Scrushy that there was no evidence that Canary influenced the prosecution team , , , binds Siegelman on this appeal," the opinion said.

Don Siegelman

1. Whether the participation in Siegelman’s prosecution by United States Attorney Leura Canary, after she had ostensibly disqualified herself from the case due to a conflict of interests, necessitates a new trial, or at least warrants an evidentiary hearing.

Even if these manifestations of Canary’s continuing involvement were not, by themselves, sufficient to warrant reversal, the district court erred by refusing to order further discovery. When discovery is sought in support of a motion for a new trial, discovery should be ordered “where specific allegations show reason to believe that the [defendant] may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief.” Arthur v. Allen, 459 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 908-09 (1997))

We also affirm the magistrate judge’s denial of Siegelman’s related motion for additional discovery on this issue. See Scrushy, 721 F.3d at 1303 n.27.

As most commonly defined, the law-of-the-case doctrine “posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case .” Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1250 (2011) . . .  Importantly, we also have held that the doctrine applies to those issues decided on a co-defendant’s earlier but closely related appeal. See United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1356 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that the co-defendants’ prior appeal mooted any subsequent appeal by the defendant under the law-of-the-case doctrine because the defendant’s appeal would have challenged the same joint motion that his co-defendants’ appeal had unsuccessfully challenged).

There are some narrow exceptions to the law-of-the-case doctrine. See United States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11th Cir. 1996) (“We have recognized narrow exceptions to the law of the case doctrine, where there is new evidence, an intervening change in controlling law dictating a different result, or the appellate decision, if implemented, would cause manifest injustice because it is clearly erroneous.”). We conclude that none of these exceptions apply here . . . 

UAB campus

"The hidden agenda is to focus UAB as medical school only, UAH as math and science only . . . (board of trustees) presidents have pushed this agenda . . . Deep pockets of trustees allow them to buy whatever they want."

(It was) no less than a former member of the University of Alabama System Board of Trustees responding to my queries concerning Ray Watts and the imminent termination of football (and bowling, and rifle, as it turned out) at UAB. This source is the ultimate insider, who refuses to go public out of deep fear of retaliation.

From that moment forward, I knew that the battle for football at UAB was about much more than athletics. It is a last stand by Birmingham against those on the UA board who wish to crush autonomous public higher education in the Magic City.

This debt is the result of a growth plan run amok at the Capstone, without any UA board restraint. Current UA System Chancellor Robert Witt created this plan as UA president in 2003, with dreams of UA at last becoming a tier-one research university, growing a larger student body, and serving the citizens of the state.

The plan didn't work. The research university dreams at UA have crashed and burned. Witt's big push barely moved the needle on the national ranking of UA among research universities (UA was a miserable 190th in the nation in research expenditures in 2013). I have recently learned through sources at the Capstone that there will soon be zero "hard money" funding for any college-based research centers or institutes on the UA campus, a tacit admission of failure.

UAH campus

How bad is the situation? A respected academic colleague at another flagship university with inside knowledge of the situation in Tuscaloosa gave me his assessment: " . . . a very unsustainable model . . . they are driving 100 mph toward a brick wall."

This is where the over 17,000 undergraduates at the Birmingham and Huntsville campuses likely come in. UA needs more in-state undergraduates to maintain the illusion of a commitment to the state of Alabama and keep the state's power-brokers happy. How many more in-staters are needed? A lot—because at the same time, UA is going to have to keep bringing in even more out-of-staters to try to grow its revenues faster than its spiraling debt. Where could UA magically find thousands upon thousands of in-state students to enroll? The perfect solution: Shut down UAB and UAH at the undergraduate level and herd those students to Tuscaloosa. Judging from the current mission statements of UAB and UAH that curiously omit the word "undergraduate," this plan has been in the works for a while. My trustee source confirms this.

Could a Board of Trustees be so short-sighted and venal as to contemplate the gutting of two universities in order to pay off the irresponsible billion-dollar debt of a third? This is Alabama. Yes.

In summary, the decisions made at UAB during the past six months regarding athletics, by a president servile to the UA board are the beginning of the end of UAB as we know it. Sports will go first, followed by the undergraduate programs.

In doing so, the board is killing the goose that has laid the golden eggs.

California journalist Joshua Wolf, who was incarcerated for 226 days

Joshua Wolf (2006)--A free-lance blogger and videographer in San Francisco, Wolf was jailed for refusing to turn over a videotape of a 2005 protest. Wolf taped clashes between demonstrators and San Francisco police during a June 2005 protest by anarchists against a Group of Eight economic conference. Wolf sold footage of the protest to San Francisco television stations and posted it on his Web site. Investigators wanted Wolf's testimony and portions of his videotape that were not broadcast, as part of a probe into possible criminal activity, including an alleged attempt by protesters to burn a police vehicle. Wolf was in prison from August 2006 to April 2007.

Vanessa Leggett (2001)--A free-lance writer in Houston, Texas, Leggett was jailed without bond for refusing to turn over research for a book she was writing about the 1997 murder of Houston socialite Doris Angleton. Leggett was in jail from July 20, 2001, to January 4, 2002.

B. Avant Edenfield

A hunting club in rural Alabama provides the setting for Alabama judges and lawyers to fix divorce cases, according to two lawsuits filed in U.S. district court. Public documents indicate the club also might be involved in fixing criminal cases.

The allegations do not come from a regular citizen; they come from a legal insider--attorney Joseph W. Blackburn, who teaches tax law at Samford University's Cumberland School of Law.

Both lawsuits claim that a hunting club--which sources tell Legal Schnauzer is in Lowndes County, near Hayneville--served as the base for a criminal enterprise under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).

Included as defendants in the lawsuits are Birmingham attorneys Charles Gorham, George Richard Fernambucq and L. Stephen Wright--in combination with "unknown defendants"--who hunted and fished together as controlling members of the hunting club. Judge John C. Calhoun, who lost his re-election bid in 2006, and Judge R. A. "Sonny" Ferguson, who remains on the domestic-relations bench (now retired), also are defendants.

In the first lawsuit, filed in 2007, Blackburn was a plaintiff, claiming he was injured by the corrupt actions of lawyers and judges during his divorce from Sharon Lovelace Blackburn, a federal judge. In the second lawsuit, filed in August 2009, Blackburn serves as attorney for plaintiffs claiming they were victimized in Jefferson County domestic-relations court.

According to court documents, Blackburn accuses the judges and lawyers of conspiring to run "a 'good ole white boys' club,' aimed at ensuring that only white males, to the exclusion of everyone else, would run the Jefferson County, Alabama circuit-court system."

The hunting club is at the heart of the illegal activity, Blackburn alleges, and it involves substantial sums of money. Why was the club formed? Court documents provide the answer, stating that "RICO enterprise" aims were to:

(a) stream illegal benefits to any "club" judges;

(b) inflate attorney fee awards--at the expense of hapless litigants--to club lawyers; and

(c) defraud the public, specifically women and minorities, by keeping the club secret from them while insiders benefited from favorable judicial treatment.

Both Rule 56 and Eleventh Circuit case law state that summary judgment cannot be granted when the nonmoving party (in this case, Blackburn and the other plaintiffs) have been given no opportunity to conduct discovery. As we explained previously, this is all laid out in a case styled Snook v. Trust Company Bank of Georgia, 859 F. 2d 865 (11th Cir., 1988). From our earlier post:

Snook states, in pertinent part: "This court has often noted that summary judgment should not be granted until the party opposing the motion has had an adequate opportunity for discovery. . . . The party opposing a motion for summary judgment has a right to challenge the affidavits and other factual materials submitted in support of the motion by conducting sufficient discovery so as to enable him to determine whether he can furnish opposing affidavits."

Sounds simple, doesn't it? So how could federal judges get it wrong? Well, Edenfield's own words show he intentionally cheated the plaintiffs . . .

The record shows that Blackburn and the other plaintiffs asked for an opportunity to conduct discovery, and they were denied. The record also shows that Edenfield considered at least two "matters outside the pleadings." As we've already shown, that means the motions to dismiss had to be treated under the rules for summary judgment--and discovery had to be conducted. So we've established that Edenfield got it wrong. Now, let's establish that he got it wrong on purpose. To do that, we visit page 24 of Edenfield's ruling. (See the ruling at the end of this post.) In footnote 17, Edenfield writes:

In that the Court is relying on evidence outside the pleadings, it will apply the summary judgment standards set forth in Part II(C) supra.

Despite our close relationship, he never favored me or my clients. If anything, he bent the other way to ensure fairness. For Judge Edenfield, the law was always supreme and, when it came to the law, relationships came second.